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100 S.Ct. 856 
Supreme Court of the United States 








Nos. 78–857, 78–997. | Argued Oct. 10, 1979. | 
Decided Feb. 20, 1980. 
On petition for enforcement of an order of the National 
Labor Relations Board, the Court of Appeals, Mulligan, 
Circuit Judge, 582 F.2d 686, denied petition, and 
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice 
Powell, held that private university’s full-time faculty 
members whose authority in academic matters was 
absolute, who decided what courses would be offered, 
when they would be scheduled, and to whom they would 
be taught, who determined teaching methods, grading 
policies, and matriculation standards, and who effectively 
decided which students would be admitted, retained and 
graduated, exercised supervisory and managerial 
functions and were therefore excluded from the category 
of employees entitled to benefits of collective bargaining 
under the National Labor Relations Act. 
Affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented and filed opinion in which 




West Headnotes (3) 
 
 
1 Labor and Employment 
Supervisory Employees 
 
 For purposes of provision of National Labor 
Relations Act excluding managerial employees 
from the categories of employees entitled to the 
benefits of collective bargaining of the Act, 
“managerial employees” are defined as those 
who formulate and effectuate management 
policies by expressing and making operative the 
decisions of their employer; managerial 
employees must exercise discretion within or 
even independently of established employer 
policy and must be aligned with management, 
and normally, an employee may be excluded as 
managerial only if he represents management 
interests by taking or recommending 
discretionary actions that effectively control or 
implement employer policy. National Labor 
Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3, 11), 14(a) as 
amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq., 152(3, 11), 
164(a). 
98 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
2 Labor and Employment 
Supervisory Employees 
 
 Private university’s full-time faculty members 
whose authority in academic matters was 
absolute, who decided what courses would be 
offered, when they would be scheduled, and to 
whom they would be taught, who determined 
teaching methods, grading policies, and 
matriculation standards, and who effectively 
decided which students would be admitted, 
retained and graduated, exercised supervisory 
and managerial functions and were therefore 
excluded from the category of employees 
entitled to benefits of collective bargaining 
under the National Labor Relations Act. 
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3, 
11), 14(a) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et 
seq., 152(3, 11), 164(a). 
77 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
3 Labor and Employment 
Representation proceedings 
 
 The absence of factual analysis in National 
Labor Relations Board’s opinion which ruled 
that full-time faculty members of private 
university were managerial employees excluded 
them from coverage under the National Labor 
Relations Act reflected the Board’s view that the 
managerial status of faculty members could be 
decided on the basis of conclusory rationales 
rather than examination of the facts of each case, 
and therefore, the deference normally accorded 
the expertise of the Board when its conclusions 
are rationally based on articulated facts and 
consistent with the Act was not applicable. 
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**857 *672 Syllabus* 
Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) filed a 
representation petition with the National Labor Relations 
Board (Board), seeking certification as bargaining agent 
for the full-time faculty members of certain schools of 
Yeshiva University, a private university. The University 
opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty 
members are managerial or supervisory personnel and 
hence not employees within the meaning of the National 
Labor Relations Act (Act). The evidence at hearings 
before the Board’s hearing officer showed, inter alia, that 
a central administrative hierarchy serves all of the 
University’s schools, with University-wide policies being 
formulated by the central administration upon approval of 
the Board of Trustees. However, the individual schools 
within the University are substantially autonomous, and 
the faculty members at each school effectively determine 
its curriculum, grading system, admission and 
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course 
schedules. Also, the overwhelming majority of faculty 
recommendations as to faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, 
termination, and promotion are implemented. The Board 
granted the Union’s petition and directed an election. 
Summarily rejecting the University’s contention that its 
faculty members are managerial employees, the Board 
held that the faculty members are professional employees 
entitled to the Act’s protection. After the Union won the 
election and was certified, the University refused to 
bargain. In subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings, 
the Board ordered the University to bargain and sought 
enforcement in the Court of Appeals, which denied the 
petition. The court agreed that the faculty members are 
professional employees under § 2(12) of the Act, found 
that the Board had ignored “the extensive control of 
Yeshiva’s faculty” over academic and personnel decisions 
as well as its “crucial role . . . in determining other central 
policies of the institution,” and accordingly held that the 
faculty members are endowed with “managerial status” 
sufficient to remove them from the Act’s coverage. 
*673 Held : The University’s full-time faculty members 
are managerial employees excluded from the Act’s 
coverage. Pp. 861–866. 
(a) The authority structure of a university does not fit 
neatly into the statutory scheme, because authority in the 
typical “mature” private university is divided between a 
central administration and one or more collegial bodies. 
The absence of explicit congressional direction does not 
preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of 
employment, and the Board has approved the formation 
of bargaining units composed of faculty members on the 
ground that they are “professional employees” under § 
2(12) of the Act. Nevertheless professionals may be 
exempted from coverage under the judicially implied 
exclusion **858 for “managerial employees” when they 
are involved in developing and implementing employer 
policy. Pp. 861–862. 
(b) Here, application of the managerial exclusion to the 
University’s faculty members is not precluded on the 
theory that they are not aligned with management because 
they are expected to exercise “independent professional 
judgment” while participating in academic governance 
and to pursue professional values rather than institutional 
interests. The controlling consideration is that the faculty 
exercises authority which in any other context 
unquestionably would be managerial, its authority in 
academic matters being absolute. The faculty’s 
professional interests—as applied to governance at a 
university like Yeshiva which depends on the professional 
judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply 
policies—cannot be separated from those of the 
institution, and thus it cannot be said that a faculty 
member exercising independent judgment acts primarily 
in his own interest and does not represent the interest of 
his employer. Pp. 862–866. 
(c) The deference ordinarily due the Board’s expertise 
does not require reversal of the Court of Appeals’ 
decision. This Court respects the Board’s expertise when 
its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts 
and consistent with the Act, but here the Board’s decision 
satisfies neither criterion. P. 867. 
2nd Cir., 582 F.2d 686, affirmed. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Norton J. Come, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in no. 
78–857. 
*674 Ronald H. Shechtman, New York City, for 
petitioner in no. 78–997. 
Marvin E. Frankel, New York City, for respondent in both 
cases. 
Opinion 
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Supervisors and managerial employees are excluded from 
the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of 
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations 
Act.1 The question presented is whether the full-time 
faculty of Yeshiva University fall within those exclusions. 
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I 
Yeshiva is a private university which conducts a broad 
range of arts and sciences programs at its five 
undergraduate and eight graduate schools in New York 
City. On October 30, 1974, the Yeshiva University 
Faculty Association (Union) filed a representation petition 
with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The 
Union sought certification as bargaining agent for the 
full-time faculty members at 10 of the 13 *675 schools.2 
The University opposed the petition on the ground that all 
of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory 
personnel and hence not employees within the meaning of 
the National Labor Relations Act (Act). A 
Board-appointed hearing officer held hearings over a 
period of five months, generating a voluminous record. 
The evidence at the hearings showed that a central 
administrative hierarchy serves all of the University’s 
schools. Ultimate authority is vested in a Board of 
Trustees, whose members (other than the President) hold 
no administrative positions at the University. The 
President sits on the Board of **859 Trustees and serves 
as chief executive officer, assisted by four Vice Presidents 
who oversee, respectively, medical affairs and science, 
student affairs, business affairs, and academic affairs. An 
Executive Council of Deans and administrators makes 
recommendations to the President on a wide variety of 
matters. 
University-wide policies are formulated by the central 
administration with the approval of the Board of Trustees, 
and include general guidelines dealing with teaching 
loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and 
fringe benefits. The budget for each school is drafted by 
its Dean or Director, subject to approval by the President 
after consultation with a committee of administrators.3 
The faculty participate *676 in University-wide 
governance through their representatives on an elected 
student-faculty advisory council. The only 
University-wide faculty body is the Faculty Review 
Committee, composed of elected representatives who 
adjust grievances by informal negotiation and also may 
make formal recommendations to the Dean of the affected 
school or to the President. Such recommendations are 
purely advisory. 
The individual schools within the University are 
substantially autonomous. Each is headed by a Dean or 
Director, and faculty members at each school meet 
formally and informally to discuss and decide matters of 
institutional and professional concern. At four schools, 
formal meetings are convened regularly pursuant to 
written bylaws. The remaining faculties meet when 
convened by the Dean or Director. Most of the schools 
also have faculty committees concerned with special areas 
of educational policy. Faculty welfare committees 
negotiate with administrators concerning salary and 
conditions of employment. Through these meetings and 
committees, the faculty at each school effectively 
determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and 
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course 
schedules.4 
*677 Faculty power at Yeshiva’s schools extends beyond 
strictly academic concerns. The faculty at each school 
make recommendations to the Dean or Director in every 
case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and 
promotion. Although the final decision is reached by the 
central administration on the advice of the Dean or 
Director, the overwhelming majority of faculty 
recommendations are implemented.5 **860 Even when 
financial problems in the early 1970’s restricted 
Yeshiva’s budget, faculty recommendations still largely 
controlled personnel decisions made within the 
constraints imposed by the administration. Indeed, the 
faculty of one school recently drew up new and binding 
policies expanding their own role in these matters. In 
addition, some faculties make final decisions regarding 
the admission, expulsion, and graduation of individual 
students. Others have decided questions involving 
teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and 




A three-member panel of the Board granted the Union’s 
petition in December 1975, and directed an election in a 
bargaining unit consisting of all full-time faculty 
members at the affected schools. 221 N.L.R.B. 1053 
(1975). The unit included Assistant Deans, senior 
professors, and department chairmen, as well as associate 
professors, assistant professors, and instructors.7 Deans 
and Directors were excluded. The Board summarily 
rejected the University’s contention that its entire faculty 
are managerial, viewing the claim as a request for 
reconsideration of previous Board decisions on the issue. 
Instead of making findings of fact as to Yeshiva, the 
Board referred generally to the record and found no 
“significan[t]” difference between this faculty and others 
it had considered. The Board concluded that the faculty 
are professional employees entitled to the protection of 
the Act because “faculty participation in collegial 
decision making is on a collective rather than individual 
basis, it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather 
than ‘in the interest of the employer,’ and final authority 
rests with the board of trustees.” Id., at 1054 (footnote 
omitted).8 
*679 The Union won the election and was certified by the 
Board. The University refused to bargain, reasserting its 
view that the faculty are managerial. In the subsequent 
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unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board refused to 
reconsider its holding in the representation proceeding 
and ordered the University to bargain with the Union. 231 
N.L.R.B. 597 (1977). When the University still refused to 
sit down at the negotiating table, the Board sought 
enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which denied the petition. 582 F.2d 686 (1978). 
Since the Board had made no findings of fact, the court 
examined the record and related the circumstances in 
considerable detail. It agreed that the faculty are 
professional employees under § 2(12) of the Act. 29 
U.S.C. § 152(12). But the court found that the Board had 
ignored “the extensive control of Yeshiva’s faculty” over 
academic and personnel decisions as well as **861 the 
“crucial role of the full-time faculty in determining other 
central policies of the institution.” 582 F.2d, at 698. The 
court concluded that such power is not an exercise of 
individual professional expertise. Rather, the faculty are, 
“in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the 
enterprise.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that the 
faculty are endowed with “managerial status” sufficient to 
remove them from the coverage of the Act. We granted 
certiorari, 440 U.S. 906, 99 S.Ct. 1212, 59 L.Ed.2d 453 
(1979), and now affirm. 
 
III 
There is no evidence that Congress has considered 
whether a university faculty may organize for collective 
bargaining under the Act. Indeed, when the Wagner and 
Taft-Hartley Acts were approved, it was thought that 
congressional power did not extend to university faculties 
because they were employed by nonprofit institutions 
which did not “affect commerce.” *680 See NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504–505, 99 
S.Ct. 1313, 1320–1321, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979).9 
Moreover, the authority structure of a university does not 
fit neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to 
interpret. The Board itself has noted that the concept of 
collegiality “does not square with the traditional authority 
structures with which th[e] Act was designed to cope in 
the typical organizations of the commercial world.” 
Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). 
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of 
management-employee relations that prevail in the 
pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. Ibid. In 
contrast, authority in the typical “mature” private 
university is divided between a central administration and 
one or more collegial bodies. See J. Baldridge, Power and 
Conflict in the University 114 (1971). This system of 
“shared authority” evolved from the medieval model of 
collegial decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars were 
responsible only to themselves. See N. Fehl, The Idea of a 
University in East and West 36–46 (1962); D. Knowles, 
The Evolution of Medieval Thought 164–168 (1962). At 
early universities, the faculty were the school. Although 
faculties have been subject to external control in the 
United States since colonial times, J. Brubacher & W. 
Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of 
American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1976, pp. 
25–30 (3d ed. 1976), traditions of collegiality continue to 
play a significant role at many universities, including 
Yeshiva.10 For these reasons, the Board has *681 
recognized that principles developed for use in the 
industrial setting cannot be “imposed blindly on the 
academic world.” Syracuse University, 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 
643 (1973). 
The absence of explicit congressional direction, of course, 
does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular 
type of employment. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124–131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 857–860, 88 
L.Ed. 1170 (1944). Acting under its responsibility for 
adapting the broad provisions of the Act to differing 
workplaces, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a 
university for the first time in 1970. Cornell University, 
183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Within a year it had approved 
the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty 
members. **862 C. W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 
(1971).11 The Board reasoned that faculty members are 
“professional employees” within the meaning of § 2(12) 
of the Act and therefore are entitled to the benefits of 
collective bargaining. 189 N.L.R.B., at 905; 29 U.S.C. § 
152(12).12 
Yeshiva does not contend that its faculty are not 
professionals under the statute. But professionals, like 
other employees, may be exempted from coverage under 
the Act’s exclusion *682 for “supervisors” who use 
independent judgment in overseeing other employees in 
the interest of the employer,13 or under the judicially 
implied exclusion for “managerial employees” who are 
involved in developing and enforcing employer policy.14 
Both exemptions grow out of the same concern: That an 
employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its 
representatives. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, 
416 U.S. 653, 661–662, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 2027–2028, 40 
L.Ed.2d 443 (1974); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 
U.S. 267, 281–282, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1765, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 
(1974). Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to 
be managerial employees, it did not decide the question of 
their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with 
that court’s application of the managerial exclusion, we 
also need not resolve that issue of statutory interpretation. 
 
IV 
1 Managerial employees are defined as those who “ 
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‘formulate and effectuate management policies by 
expressing and making operative the decisions of their 
employer.’ ” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 288, 
94 S.Ct., at 1768 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning 
Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323, n. 4 (1947)). These 
employees are “much higher in the managerial structure” 
than those explicitly mentioned by Congress, which 
“regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no 
specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary.” 
416 U.S., at 283, 94 S.Ct., at 1766. *683 Managerial 
employees must exercise discretion within, or even 
independently of, established employer policy and must 
be aligned with management. See id., at 286–287, 94 
S.Ct., at 1767–1768 (citing cases). Although the Board 
has established no firm criteria for determining when an 
employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be 
excluded as managerial only if he represents management 
interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions 
that effectively control or implement employer policy.15 
The Board does not contend that the Yeshiva faculty’s 
decisionmaking is too insignificant **863 to be deemed 
managerial.16 Nor does it suggest that the role of the 
faculty is merely advisory and thus not managerial.17 
Instead, it contends that the managerial exclusion cannot 
be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional 
employees because those employees *684 often appear to 
be exercising managerial authority when they are merely 
performing routine job duties. The status of such 
employees, in the Board’s view, must be determined by 
reference to the “alignment with management” criterion. 
The Board argues that the Yeshiva faculty are not aligned 
with management because they are expected to exercise 
“independent professional judgment” while participating 
in academic governance, and because they are neither 
“expected to conform to management policies [nor] 
judged according to their effectiveness in carrying out 
those policies.” Because of this independence, the Board 
contends there is no danger of divided loyalty and no need 
for the managerial exclusion. In its view, union pressure 
cannot divert the faculty from adhering to the interests of 
the university, because the university itself expects its 
faculty to pursue professional values rather than 
institutional interests. The Board concludes that 
application of the managerial exclusion to such 
employees would frustrate the national labor policy in 
favor of collective bargaining. 
This “independent professional judgment” test was not 
applied in the decision we are asked to uphold. The 
Board’s opinion relies exclusively on its previous faculty 
decisions for both legal and factual analysis. 221 
N.L.R.B., at 1054. But those decisions only dimly 
foreshadow the reasoning now proffered to the Court. 
Without explanation, the Board initially announced two 
different rationales for faculty cases,18 *685 then quickly 
transformed them into a litany to be repeated in case after 
case: (i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised 
in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of 
the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board 
of trustees. Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 
250 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634 
(1974); see Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 30 
(1972).19 In their arguments in this case, the Board’s 
lawyers have abandoned the first and third branches of 
**864 this analysis,20 which in any event were flatly 
inconsistent with its precedents,21 and have transformed 
the second into a theory that does not appear clearly in 
any Board opinion.22 
 
*686 V 
2 The controlling consideration in this case is that the 
faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in 
any other context unquestionably would be managerial. 
Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They 
decide what courses will be offered, when they will be 
scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate 
and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and 
matriculation standards. They effectively decide which 
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On 
Occasion their views have determined the size of the 
student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of 
a school. When one considers the function of a university, 
it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than 
these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the 
faculty determines within each school the product to be 
produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the 
customers who will be served.23 
The Board nevertheless insists that these decisions are not 
managerial because they require the exercise of 
independent professional judgment. We are not persuaded 
by this argument. There may be some tension between the 
Act’s exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion 
of professionals, since most professionals in managerial 
positions continue to draw on their special skills and 
training. But we have been directed to no authority 
suggesting that that tension can be resolved by reference 
to the “independent professional judgment” criterion *687 
proposed in this case.24 Outside the university context, 
the Board routinely has applied the managerial and 
supervisory exclusions to professionals in executive 
positions **865 without inquiring whether their decisions 
were based on management policy rather than 
professional expertise.25 Indeed, the Board has twice 
implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on 
professional judgment cannot be managerial.26 Since the 
Board does not suggest that the “independent professional 
judgment” test is to be limited to university faculty, its 
new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of 
Board precedent and could result in the indiscriminate 
recharacterization as covered employees of professionals 
5
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working in supervisory and managerial capacities. 
Moreover, the Board’s approach would undermine the 
goal it purports to serve: To ensure that employees who 
exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer 
will not *688 divide their loyalty between employer and 
union. In arguing that a faculty member exercising 
independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest 
and therefore does not represent the interest of his 
employer, the Board assumes that the professional 
interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution 
are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty 
member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court 
of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and 
we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional 
interests—as applied to governance at a university like 
Yeshiva—cannot be separated from those of the 
institution. 
In such a university, the predominant policy normally is 
to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will 
accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the 
limits of its financial resources. The “business” of a 
university is education, and its vitality ultimately must 
depend on academic policies that largely are formulated 
and generally are implemented by faculty governance 
decisions. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing 
Authority Effectively 23–24 (1978). Faculty members 
enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional 
mission by ensuring that the university’s objectives are 
met. But there can be no doubt that the quest for academic 
excellence and institutional distinction is a “policy” to 
which the administration expects the faculty to adhere, 
whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional 
goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an employee is 
“expected to conform” to one goal or another when the 
two are essentially the same.27 See *689 NLRB v. Scott 
Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 630 (CA1 1971) (tractor 
owner-operators); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 
F.2d 697, 699 (CA5 1964) (same), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 
903, 85 S.Ct. 1448, 14 L.Ed.2d 285 (1965). 
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a 
university like Yeshiva, which depends on the 
professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and 
apply **866 crucial policies constrained only by 
necessarily general institutional goals. The university 
requires faculty participation in governance because 
professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation 
and implementation of academic policy.28 It may appear, 
as the Board contends, that the professor performing 
governance functions is less “accountable” for departures 
from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial 
manager whose discretion is more confined. Moreover, 
traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the 
professor from some of the sanctions applied to an 
industrial manager who fails to adhere to company policy. 
But the analogy of the university to industry need not, and 
indeed cannot, be complete. It is clear that Yeshiva and 
like universities must rely on their faculties to participate 
in the making and implementation of their policies.29 The 
large measure of independence *690 enjoyed by faculty 
members can only increase the danger that divided loyalty 
will lead to those harms that the Board traditionally has 
sought to prevent. 
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the 
managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals 
outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed 
intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that 
employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine 
discharge of professional duties in projects to which they 
have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage 
even if union membership arguably may involve some 
divided loyalty.30 Only if an employee’s activities fall 
outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by 
similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned 
with management. We think these decisions accurately 
capture the intent of Congress, and that they provide an 
appropriate starting point for analysis in cases involving 
professionals alleged to be managerial.31 
 
*691 **867 VI 
3 Finally, the Board contends that the deference due its 
expertise in these matters requires us to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. The question we decide 
today is a mixed one of fact and law. But the Board’s 
opinion may be searched in vain for relevant findings of 
fact. The absence of factual analysis apparently reflects 
the Board’s view that the managerial status of particular 
faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory 
rationales rather than examination of the facts of each 
case. The Court of Appeals took a different view, and 
determined that the faculty of Yeshiva University, “in 
effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the 
enterprise.” 582 F.2d at 698. We find no reason to reject 
this conclusion. As our decisions consistently show, we 
accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its 
conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and 
consistent with the Act. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 
437 U.S. 483, 501, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 2473, 57 L.Ed.2d 370 
(1978). In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision 
satisfies neither criterion. 
Affirmed. 
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE, 
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In holding that the full-time faculty members of Yeshiva 
University are not covered employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act, but instead fall within the exclusion 
for *692 supervisors and managerial employees, the Court 
disagrees with the determination of the National Labor 
Relations Board. Because I believe that the Board’s 
decision was neither irrational nor inconsistent with the 
Act, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I 
Ten years ago the Board first asserted jurisdiction over 
private nonprofit institutions of higher education. Cornell 
University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Since then, the 
Board has often struggled with the Procrustean task of 
attempting to implement in the altogether different 
environment of the academic community the broad 
directives of a statutory scheme designed for the 
bureaucratic industrial workplace. See, e. g., Adelphi 
University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). Resolution of 
the particular issue presented in this case—whether 
full-time faculty members are covered “employees” under 
the Act—is but one of several challenges confronting the 
Board in this “unchartered area.” C. W. Post Center, 189 
N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971). 
Because at the time of the Act’s passage Congress did not 
contemplate its application to private universities, it is not 
surprising that the terms of the Act itself provide no 
answer to the question before us. Indeed, the statute 
evidences significant tension as to congressional intent in 
this respect by its explicit inclusion, on the one hand, of 
“professional employees” under § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 
152(12), and its exclusion, on the other, of “supervisors” 
under § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Similarly, when 
transplanted to the academic arena, the Act’s extension of 
coverage to professionals under § 2(12) cannot easily be 
squared with the Board-created exclusion of “managerial 
employees” in the industrial context. See generally NLRB 
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 
L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). 
Primary authority to resolve these conflicts and to adapt 
the Act to the changing patterns of industrial relations was 
*693 entrusted to the Board, not to the judiciary. NLRB v. 
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266, 95 S.Ct. 959, 969, 
43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975). The Court has often admonished 
that “[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the 
conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking 
that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a 
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress 
committed primarily to the National Labor Relations 
Board, subject to limited judicial review.” **868  NLRB 
v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96, 77 S.Ct. 643, 648, 1 
L.Ed.2d 676 (1957). Accord, Beth Israel Hospital v. 
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 2473, 57 
L.Ed.2d 370 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 
U.S. 221, 235–236, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 
(1963). Through its cumulative experience in dealing with 
labor-management relations in a variety of industrial and 
nonindustrial settings, it is the Board that has developed 
the expertise to determine whether coverage of a 
particular category of employees would further the 
objectives of the Act.1 And through its continuous 
oversight of industrial conditions, it is the Board that is 
best able to formulate and adjust national labor policy to 
conform to the realities of industrial life. Accordingly, the 
judicial role is limited; a court may not substitute its own 
judgment for that of the Board. The Board’s decision may 
be reviewed for its rationality and its consistency with the 
*694 Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order 
must be enforced. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 
supra, 437 U.S., at 501, 98 S.Ct., at 2473. 
 
II 
In any event, I believe the Board reached the correct 
result in determining that Yeshiva’s full-time faculty is 
covered under the NLRA. The Court does not dispute that 
the faculty members are “professional employees” for the 
purposes of collective bargaining under § 2(12), but 
nevertheless finds them excluded from coverage under the 
implied exclusion for managerial employees.”2 The Court 
explains that “[t]he controlling consideration in this case 
is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority 
which in any other context unquestionably would be 
managerial.” Ante, at 864. But the academic community is 
simply not “any other context.” The Court purports to 
recognize that there are fundamental differences between 
the authority structures of the typical industrial and 
academic institutions which preclude the blind 
transplanting of principles developed in one arena onto 
the other; yet it nevertheless ignores those very 
differences in concluding that Yeshiva’s faculty is 
excluded from the Act’s coverage. 
As reflected in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments of 1947, the concern behind the exclusion 
of supervisors under § 2(11) of the Act is twofold. On the 
one hand, Congress sought to protect the rank-and-file 
employees from being unduly influenced in their selection 
of leaders by the presence of management representatives 
in their union. “If supervisors were members of and active 
in the union which represented the employees they 
supervised it could be possible *695 for the supervisors to 
obtain and retain positions of power in the union by 
reason of their authority over their fellow union members 
while working on the job.” NLRB v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1178 (CA2 1968). In addition, 
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Congress wanted to ensure that employers would not be 
deprived of the **869 undivided loyalty of their 
supervisory foremen. Congress was concerned that if 
supervisors were allowed to affiliate with labor 
organizations that represented the rank and file, they 
might become accountable to the workers, thus interfering 
with the supervisors’ ability to discipline and control the 
employees in the interest of the employer.3 
Identical considerations underlie the exclusion of 
managerial employees. See ante, at 862. Although a 
variety of verbal formulations have received judicial 
approval over the years, see Retail Clerks International 
Assn. v. NLRB, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 63, 65–66, 366 F.2d 
642, 644–645 (1966), this Court has recently sanctioned a 
definition of “managerial employee” that comprises those 
who “ ‘formulate and effectuate management policies by 
expressing and making operative the decisions of their 
employer.’ ” See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S., 
at 288, 94 S.Ct. at 1768. The touchstone of managerial 
status is thus an alliance with management, and the 
pivotal inquiry is whether the employee in performing his 
*696 duties represents his own interests or those of his 
employer.4 If his actions are undertaken for the purpose of 
implementing the employer’s policies, then he is 
accountable to management and may be subject to 
conflicting loyalties. But if the employee is acting only on 
his own behalf and in his own interest, he is covered 
under the Act and is entitled to the benefits of collective 
bargaining. 
After examining the voluminous record in this case,5 the 
Board determined that the faculty at Yeshiva exercised its 
decisionmaking authority in its own interest rather than 
“in the interest of the employer.” 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 
1054 (1975). The Court, in contrast, can perceive “no 
justification for this distinction” and concludes that the 
faculty’s interests “cannot be separated from those of the 
institution.” Ante, at 865.6 But the Court’s vision is 
clouded by its failure fully to discern and comprehend the 
nature of the faculty’s role in university governance. 
Unlike the purely hierarchical decisionmaking structure 
that prevails in the typical industrial organization, the 
bureaucratic foundation of most “mature” universities is 
characterized by dual authority systems. The primary 
decisional *697 network is hierarchical in nature: 
Authority is lodged in the administration, and a formal 
chain of command runs from a lay governing board down 
through university officers to individual **870 faculty 
members and students. At the same time, there exists a 
parallel professional network, in which formal 
mechanisms have been created to bring the expertise of 
the faculty into the decisionmaking process. See J. 
Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University 114 
(1971); Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 
U.Toledo L.Rev. 608, 614–618 (1974). 
What the Board realized—and what the Court fails to 
apprehend—is that whatever influence the faculty wields 
in university decisionmaking is attributable solely to its 
collective expertise as professional educators, and not to 
any managerial or supervisory prerogatives. Although the 
administration may look to the faculty for advice on 
matters of professional and academic concern, the faculty 
offers its recommendations in order to serve its own 
independent interest in creating the most effective 
environment for learning, teaching, and scholarship.7 And 
while the administration may attempt to defer to the 
faculty’s competence whenever possible, it must and does 
apply its own distinct perspective to those 
recommendations, a perspective that is based on fiscal 
*698 and other managerial policies which the faculty has 
no part in developing. The University always retains the 
ultimate decisionmaking authority, see ante, at 858–859, 
and the administration gives what weight and import to 
the faculty’s collective judgment as it chooses and deems 
consistent with its own perception of the institution’s 
needs and objectives.8 
The premise of a finding of managerial status is a 
determination that the excluded employee is acting on 
behalf of management and is answerable to a higher 
authority in the exercise of his responsibilities. The Board 
has consistently implemented this requirement—both for 
professional and non-professional employees—by 
conferring managerial status only upon those employees 
“whose interests are closely aligned with management as 
true representatives of management.” (Emphasis added.) 
E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 
N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); *699 Bell Aerospace, 219 
N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975); **871 General Dynamics 
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974).9 Only if the 
employee is expected to conform to management policies 
and is judged by his effectiveness in executing those 
policies does the danger of divided loyalties exist. 
Yeshiva’s faculty, however, is not accountable to the 
administration in its governance function, nor is any 
individual faculty member subject to personal sanction or 
control based on the administration’s assessment of the 
worth of his recommendations. When the faculty, through 
the schools’ advisory committees, participates in 
university decisionmaking on subjects of academic 
policy, it does not serve as the “representative of 
management.”10 Unlike industrial supervisors *700 and 
managers, university professors are not hired to “make 
operative” the policies and decisions of their employer. 
Nor are they retained on the condition that their interests 
will correspond to those of the university administration. 
Indeed, the notion that a faculty member’s professional 
competence could depend on his undivided loyalty to 
management is antithetical to the whole concept of 
academic freedom. Faculty members are judged by their 
employer on the quality of their teaching and scholarship, 
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not on the compatibility of their advice with 
administration policy. Board Member Kennedy aptly 
concluded in his concurring opinion in Northeastern 
University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 257 (1975) (footnote 
omitted): 
“[T]he influence which the faculty exercises in many 
areas of academic governance is insufficient to make 
them ‘managerial’ employees. Such influence is not 
exercised ‘for management’ or ‘in the interest of the 
employer,’ but rather is exercised in their own 
professional interest. The best evidence of this fact is 
that faculty members are generally not held 
accountable by or to the administration for their faculty 
governance functions. Faculty criticism of 
administration policies, for example, is viewed not as a 
breach of loyalty, but as an exercise in academic 
freedom. So, too, intervention by the university 
administration in faculty deliberations would most 
likely be considered an infringement upon academic 
freedoms. Conversely, university administrations rarely 
consider themselves bound by faculty 
recommendations.” 
It is no answer to say, as does the Court, that Yeshiva’s 
faculty and administration are one and the same because 
their interests tend to coincide. In the first place, the 
National Labor Relations Act does not condition its 
coverage on an antagonism of interests between the 
employer and the employee. *701 11 The mere 
coincidence of interests **872 on many issues has never 
been thought to abrogate the right to collective bargaining 
on those topics as to which that coincidence is absent. 
Ultimately, the performance of an employee’s duties will 
always further the interests of the employer, for in no 
institution do the interests of labor and management 
totally diverge. Both desire to maintain stable and 
profitable operations, and both are committed to creating 
the best possible product within existing financial 
constraints. Differences of opinion and emphasis may 
develop, however, on exactly how to devote the 
institution’s resources to achieve those goals. When these 
disagreements surface, the national labor laws 
contemplate their resolution through the peaceful process 
of collective bargaining. And in this regard, Yeshiva 
University stands on the same footing as any other 
employer. 
Moreover, the congruence of interests in this case ought 
not to be exaggerated. The university administration has 
certain economic and fiduciary responsibilities that are 
not shared by the faculty, whose primary concerns are 
academic and relate solely to its own professional 
reputation. The record evinces numerous instances in 
which the faculty’s recommendations have been rejected 
by the administration on account of fiscal constraints or 
other managerial policies. Disputes have arisen between 
Yeshiva’s faculty and administration on such fundamental 
issues as the hiring, tenure, promotion, retirement, and 
dismissal of faculty members, *702 academic standards 
and credits, departmental budgets, and even the faculty’s 
choice of its own departmental representative.12 The very 
fact that Yeshiva’s faculty has voted for the Union to 
serve as its representative in future negotiations with the 
administration indicates that the faculty does not perceive 
its interests to be aligned with those of management. 
Indeed, on the precise topics which are specified as 
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining—wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment13—the interests of teacher and administrator 
are often diametrically opposed. 
Finally, the Court’s perception of the Yeshiva faculty’s 
status is distorted by the rose-colored lens through which 
it views the governance structure of the modern-day 
university. The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s 
professional interests are indistinguishable from those of 
the administration is bottomed on an idealized model of 
collegial decisionmaking that is a vestige of the great 
medieval university. But the university of today bears 
little resemblance to the “community of scholars” of 
yesteryear.14 **873 Education has become *703 “big 
business,” and the task of operating the university 
enterprise has been transferred from the faculty to an 
autonomous administration, which faces the same 
pressures to cut costs and increase efficiencies that 
confront any large industrial organization.15 The past 
decade of budgetary cutbacks, declining enrollments, 
reductions in faculty appointments, curtailment of 
academic programs, and increasing calls for 
accountability to alumni and other special interest groups 
has only added to the erosion of the faculty’s role in the 
institution’s decisonmaking process.16 
*704 These economic exigencies have also exacerbated 
the tensions in university labor relations, as the faculty 
and administration more and more frequently find 
themselves advocating conflicting positions not only on 
issues of compensation, job security, and working 
conditions, but even on subjects formerly thought to be 
the faculty’s prerogative. In response to this friction, and 
in an attempt to avoid the strikes and work stoppages that 
have disrupted several major universities in recent years, 
many faculties have entered into collective-bargaining 
relationships with their administrations and governing 
boards.17 An even greater number of schools—Yeshiva 
among them—have endeavored to negotiate and 
compromise their differences informally, by establishing 
avenues for faculty input into university decisions on 
matters of professional concern. 
*705 Today’s decision, however, threatens to eliminate 
much of the administration’s incentive to resolve its 
disputes with the faculty through open discussion and 
mutual agreement. By its overbroad and unwarranted 
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interpretation of the managerial exclusion, **874 the 
Court denies the faculty the protections of the NLRA and, 
in so doing, removes whatever deterrent value the Act’s 
availability may offer against unreasonable administrative 
conduct.18 Rather than promoting the Act’s objective of 
funneling dissension between employers and employees 
into collective bargaining, the Court’s decision 
undermines that goal and contributes to the possibility 
that “recurring disputes [will] fester outside the 
negotiation process until strikes or other forms of 
economic warfare occur.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 




In sum, the Board analyzed both the essential purposes 
underlying the supervisory and managerial exclusions and 
the nature of the governance structure at Yeshiva 
University. Relying on three factors that attempt to 
encapsulate the fine distinction between those 
professional employees who are entitled to the NLRA’s 
protections and those whose managerial responsibilities 
require their exclusion,19 the Board concluded *706 that 
Yeshiva’s full-time faculty qualify as the former rather 
than the latter. I believe the Board made the correct 
determination. But even were I to have reservations about 
the specific result reached by the Board on the facts of 
this case, I would certainly have to conclude that the 
Board applied a proper mode of analysis to arrive at a 
decision well within the zone of reasonableness. 
Accordingly, in light of the deference due the Board’s 
determination in this complex area, I would reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Parallel Citations 
100 S.Ct. 856, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 63 L.Ed.2d 
115, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,819 
 
 Footnotes 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience 
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. 
 
1 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a); NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). 
 
2 The schools involved are Yeshiva College, Stern College for Women, Teacher’s Institute for Women, Erna Michael College, 
Yeshiva Program, James Striar School of General Jewish Studies, Belfer Graduate School of Sciences, Ferkauf Graduate School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, Wurzweiler School of Social Work, and Bernard Revel Graduate School. The Union did not seek 
to represent the faculty of the medical school, the graduate school of medical sciences, the Yeshiva High School, or any of the 
theological programs affiliated with the University. A law school has been opened since the time of the hearings, but it does not 
figure in this case. 
 
3 At Yeshiva College, budget requests prepared by the senior professor in each subject area receive the “perfunctory” approval of the 
Dean “99 percent” of the time and have never been rejected by the central administration. App. 298–299. A council of elected 
department chairmen at Ferkauf approves the school’s budget allocations when discretionary funds are available. Id., at 626–627. 
All of these professors were included in the bargaining unit approved by the Board. 
 
4 For example, the Deans at Yeshiva and Erna Michael Colleges regard faculty actions as binding. Id., at 248–249, 312–313. 
Administrators testified that no academic initiative of either faculty had been vetoed since at least 1968. Id., at 250, 313. When the 
Stern College faculty disagreed with the Dean’s decision to delete the education major, the major was reinstituted. Id., at 191. The 
Director of the Teacher’s Institute for Women testified that “the faculty is the school,” id., at 379, while the Director of the James 
Striar School described his position as the “executive arm of the faculty,” which had overruled him on occasion, id., at 360–361. 
All decisions regarding academic matters at the Yeshiva Program and Bernard Revel are made by faculty consensus. Id., at 574, 
583–586. The “internal operation of [Wurzweiler] has been heavily governed by faculty decisions,” according to its Dean. Id., at 
502. 
 
5 One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were ultimately given effect. Id., at 624. Others could not recall 
an instance when a faculty recommendation had been overruled. Id., at 193–194. At Stern College, the Dean in six years has never 
overturned a promotion decision. Ibid. The President has accepted all decisions of the Yeshiva College faculty as to promotions 
and sabbaticals, including decisions opposed by the Dean. Id., at 268–270. At Erna Michael, the Dean has never hired a full-time 
faculty member without the consent of the affected senior professor, id., at 333–335, and the Director of Teacher’s Institute for 
Women stated baldly that no teacher had ever been hired if “there was the slightest objection, even on one faculty member’s part.” 
Id., at 388. The faculty at both these schools have overridden recommendations made by the deans. No promotion or grant of 
tenure has ever been made at Ferkauf over faculty opposition. Id., at 620, 633. The Dean of Belfer testified that he had no right to 
override faculty decisions on tenure and nonrenewal. Id., at 419. 
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6 The Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women once recommended that the school move to Brooklyn to attract students. The 
faculty rejected the proposal and the school remained in Manhattan. Id., at 379–380. 
 
7 “Full-time faculty” were defined as those 
“appointed to the University in the titles of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or 
visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans, but excluding . . . part-time faculty; 
lecturers; principal investigators; deans, acting deans and directors; [and others not relevant to this action].” 221 N.L.R.B., at 
1057. 
The term “faculty” in this opinion refers to the members of this unit as defined by the Board. 
 
8 Identical language had been employed in at least two other Board decisions. See infra, at 863. In this case, it was not supported by 
a single citation to the record. Mr. Justice BRENNAN’s dissent relies on this language, post, at 869, and adds that a faculty’s 
“primary concerns are academic and relate solely to its own professional reputation,” post, at 872. The view that faculty 
governance authority “is exercised in the faculty’s own interest” rather than that of the University assumes a lack of responsibility 
that certainly is not reflected in this record. 
 
9 See also S.Rep.No.573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935) (dispute between employer and college professor would not be covered); 
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947) U.S.Code Cong.Serv.1947, p. 1135 (listing professional employees 
covered by new statutory provision without mentioning teachers); S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 19 (1947) (same). 
 
10 See the inaugural address of Williams College President Paul Ansel Chadbourne, quoted in Kahn, The NLRB and Higher 
Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L.Rev. 63, 70, n. 16 (1973) ( “ ‘Professors are 
sometimes spoken of as working for the college. They are the college’ ”) (emphasis in original); Davis, Unions and Higher 
Education: Another View, 49 Ed. Record 139, 143 (1968) (“The president . . . is not the faculty’s master. He is as much the 
faculty’s administrator as he is the board [of trustees’]”); n. 4, supra. 
 
11 The Board has suggested that Congress tacitly approved the formation of faculty units in 1974, when the Act was amended to 
eliminate the exemption accorded to nonprofit hospitals. Although Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions 
“affect commerce” under modern economic conditions, H.R.Rep.No.93–1051, p. 4 (1974); 120 Cong.Rec. 12938 (1974) (remarks 
of Sen. Williams), there is nothing to suggest that Congress considered the status of university faculties. 
 
12 The Act provides broadly that “employees” have organizational and other rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 2(3) defines “employee” 
in general terms, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); § 2(12) defines “professional employee” in some detail, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12); and § 9(b)(1) 
prohibits the Board from creating a bargaining unit that includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a 
majority of the professionals vote for inclusion, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1). 
 
13 An employee may be excluded if he has authority over any one of 12 enumerated personnel actions, including hiring and firing. 29 
U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a). The Board has held repeatedly that professionals may be excluded as supervisors. E. g., 
University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423, 426 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1267–1269 (1975). 
 
14 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). The Board never has doubted that the 
managerial exclusion may be applied to professionals in a proper case. E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 
N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); see General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857–858 (1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 
N.L.R.B. 337, 339 (1955). 
 
15 E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, supra, at 193; Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385–386 (1975) (on remand); 
General Dynamics Corp., supra, at 857; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 274, 286–289, 94 S.Ct., at 1761–1762, 
1767–1769. 
 
16 The Board has found decisions of far less significance to the employer to be managerial when the affected employees were aligned 
with management. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956) (procurement drivers who made purchases for employers); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 (1955) (production schedulers); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 194, 
196 (1953) (lecturers who indoctrinated new employees); Western Electric Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 420, 423 (1952) (personnel 
investigators who made hiring recommendations); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116–117 (1950) (buyers who made 
substantial purchases on employer’s behalf). 
 
17 The Union does argue that the faculty’s authority is merely advisory. But the fact that the administration holds a rarely exercised 
veto power does not diminish the faculty’s effective power in policymaking and implementation. See nn. 4, 5, supra. The statutory 
definition of “supervisor” expressly contemplates that those employees who “effectively . . . recommend” the enumerated actions 
are to be excluded as supervisory. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Consistent with the concern for divided loyalty, the relevant consideration 
is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority. That rationale applies with equal force to the managerial 
exclusion. 
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18 Two cases simply announced that faculty authority is neither managerial nor supervisory because it is exercised collectively. C. W. 
Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971); Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1971). The Board later acknowledged 
that “a genuine system of collegiality would tend to confound us,” but held that the modern university departs from that system 
because “ultimate authority” is vested in a board of trustees which neither attempts to convert the faculty into managerial entities 
nor advises them to advocate management interests. Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). See Fairleigh Dickinson 
University, 227 N.L.R.B. 239, 241 (1976). 
 
19 Citing these three factors, the Board concludes in each case that faculty are professional employees. It has never explained the 
reasoning connecting the premise with the conclusion, although an argument similar to that made by its lawyers in this case 
appears in one concurring opinion.  Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B., at 257 (opinion of Member Kennedy). 
 
20 Although the Board has preserved the points in footnotes to its brief, it no longer contends that “collective authority” and “lack of 
ultimate authority” are legal rationales. They are now said to be facts which, respectively, “fortif[y]” the Board’s view that faculty 
members act in their own interest, and contradict the premise that the university is a “self-governing communit[y] of scholars.” 
Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78–857, p. 11, n. 8. Cf. n. 8, supra. 
 
21 The “collective authority” branch has never been applied to supervisors who work through committees. E. g., Florida Southern 
College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972). Nor was it thought to bar managerial status for employees who owned enough stock to 
give them, as a group, a substantial voice in the employer’s affairs. See Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971); Red 
and White Airway Cab Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798–799 (1952). Ultimate 
authority, the third branch, has never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or managerial status. Indeed, it could not be 
since every corporation vests that power in its board of directors. 
 
22 We do not, of course, substitute counsel’s post hoc rationale for the reasoning supplied by the Board itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). Because the first and third branches of the Board’s analysis are 
insupportable, the Board’s only colorable theory is the “interest of the employer” branch. The argument presented to us is an 
expanded and considerably refined version of that notion. 
 
23 The record shows that faculty members at Yeshiva also play a predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination 
and promotion. See supra, at 859–860, and n. 5. These decisions clearly have both managerial and supervisory characteristics. 
Since we do not reach the question of supervisory status, we need not rely primarily on these features of faculty authority. 
 
24 The Board has cited no case directly applying an “independent professional judgment” standard. On the related question of 
accountability for implementation of management policies, it cites only NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 550 
(CA9 1960), which held that a news editor “responsibly directed” his department so as to fall within the definition of a supervisor, 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). The court looked in part to accountability in rejecting the claim that the editor merely relayed assignments 
and thus was not “responsible” for directing employees as required by the statute. The case did not involve the managerial 
exclusion and has no application to the issues before us. 
 
25 See cases cited in nn. 13 and 14, supra. A strict “conformity to management policy” test ignores the dual nature of the managerial 
role, since managers by definition not only conform to established policies but also exercise their own judgment within the range 
of those policies. See Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B., at 385 (quoting Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 
(1963)). 
 
26 University of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220, 221–222, 229 (1973), enf’d, 506 F.2d 1402 (CA7 1974) (reversing an 
Administrative Law Judge’s decision which had been premised on the “professional judgment” rationale); Sutter Community 
Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B., at 193 (excluding as managerial a clinical specialist who used interdisciplinary 
professional skills to run a hospital department). 
 
27 At Yeshiva, administrative concerns with scarce resources and University-wide balance have led to occasional vetoes of faculty 
action. But such infrequent administrative reversals in no way detract from the institution’s primary concern with the academic 
responsibilities entrusted to the faculty. The suggestion that faculty interests depart from those of the institution with respect to 
salary and benefits is even less meritorious. The same is true of every supervisory or managerial employee. Indeed, there is 
arguably a greater community of interest on this point in the university than in industry, because the nature and quality of a 
university depend so heavily on the faculty attracted to the institution. B. Richman & R. Farmer, Leadership, Goals, and Power in 
Higher Education 258 (1974); see D. Bornheimer, G. Burns, & G. Dumke, The Faculty in Higher Education 174–175 (1973). 
 
28 See American Association for Higher Education, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance 22–24 (1967); Bornheimer, 
Burns, & Dumke, supra, at 149–150; Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P.Bull. 120, 121 
(1972). The extent to which Yeshiva faculty recommendations are implemented is no “mere coincidence,” as Mr. Justice 
BRENNAN’s dissent suggests. Post, at 872. Rather this is an inevitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by 
universities like Yeshiva. 
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29 The dissent concludes, citing several secondary authorities, that the modern university has undergone changes that have shifted 
“the task of operating the university enterprise” from faculty to administration. Post, at 872–873. The shift, if it exists, is neither 
universal nor complete. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 27–28, 158–162, 164–165 (1978). In any 
event, our decision must be based on the record before us. Nor can we decide this case by weighing the probable benefits and 
burdens of faculty collective bargaining. See post, at 872–874. That, after all, is a matter for Congress, not this Court. 
 
30 For this reason, architects and engineers functioning as project captains for work performed by teams of professionals are deemed 
employees despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members. See General Dynamics 
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B., at 857–858; Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1971); Skidmore, Owings & 
Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920, 921 (1971). See also Doctors’ Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951–952 (1970), enf’d, 
489 F.2d 772 (CA9 1973) (nurses); National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1441 (1966) (broadcast newswriters). In the 
health-care context, the Board asks in each case whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or supervisory are “incidental to” 
or “in addition to” the treatment of patients, a test Congress expressly approved in 1974. S.Rep. No. 93–766, p. 6 (1974), U.S.Code 
Cong. & Admin.News, 1974, p. 3946. 
 
31 We recognize that this is a starting point only, and that other factors not present here may enter into the analysis in other contexts. 
It is plain, for example, that professors may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses, 
evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva 
where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like 
universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It may be that a rational line could be drawn between tenured and 
untenured faculty members, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But we express no opinion on these 
questions, for it is clear that the unit approved by the Board was far too broad. 
 
1 “It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’ That task has been assigned 
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination of ‘where all the conditions of the relation 
require protection’ involves inquiries for the Board charged with this duty. Everyday experience in the administration of the statute 
gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities 
and needs of the workers for self organization and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the 
peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers. The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on the 
question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question . . . ‘belongs to the usual administrative routine’ of the Board.” 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). Accord, NLRB v. Seven-Up 
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S.Ct. 287, 290, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953). 
 
2 Because the Court concludes that Yeshiva’s full-time faculty are managerial employees, it finds it unnecessary to reach the 
University’s contention that the faculty are also excluded as “supervisors” under § 2 (11). Ante, at 862. My discussion therefore 
focuses on the question of the faculty’s managerial status, but I would resolve the issue of their supervisory status in a similar 
fashion. 
 
3 See H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1947): 
“The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the act . . . . It is inconsistent with the policy of Congress to assure to workers freedom from 
domination or control by their supervisors in their organizing and bargaining activities. It is inconsistent with our 
policy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in the 
plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in a union that claims to be ‘independent’ of the union of the rank 
and file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of their bossing the rank 
and file, the rank and file bosses them.” 
See also S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3–5 (1947). 
 
4 Section 2(11) of the Act requires, as a condition of supervisory status, that authority be exercised “in the interest of the employer.” 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). See also NLRB v. Master Stevedores Assn., 418 F.2d 140 (CA5 1969); International Union of United Brewery 
Workers v. NLRB, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 298 F.2d 297 (1961). 
 
5 The Board held hearings over a 5-month period and compiled a record containing more than 4,600 pages of testimony and 200 
exhibits. 
 
6 The Court thus determines that all of Yeshiva’s full-time faculty members are managerial employees, even though their role in 
university decisionmaking is limited to the professional recommendations of the faculty acting as a collective body, and even 
though they supervise and manage no personnel other than themselves. The anomaly of such a result demonstrates the error in 
extending the managerial exclusion to a class of essentially rank-and-file employees who do not represent the interests of 
management and who are not subject to the danger of conflicting loyalties which motivated the adoption of that exemption. 
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7 As the Board has recognized, due to the unique nature of their work, professional employees will often make recommendations on 
matters that are of great importance to management. But their desire to exert influence in these areas stems from the need to 
maintain their own professional standards, and this factor—common to all professionals—should not, by itself, preclude their 
inclusion in a bargaining unit. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337, 339–340 (1955). In fact, Congress clearly 
recognized both that professional employees consistently exercise independent judgment and discretion in the performance of their 
duties, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), and that they have a significant interest in maintaining certain professional standards, see S.Rep. 
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1947). Yet Congress specifically included professionals within the Act’s coverage. See NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 298, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1773, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (WHITE, J., dissenting in part). 
 
8 One must be careful not to overvalue the significance of the faculty’s influence on academic affairs. As one commentator has 
noted, “it is not extraordinary for employees to seek to exert influence over matters embedded in an employment relationship for 
which they share a concern, or that management would be responsive to their strongly held desires.” Finkin, The NLRB in Higher 
Education, 5 U.Toledo L.Rev. 608, 616 (1974). Who, after all, is better suited than the faculty to decide what courses should be 
offered, how they should be taught, and by what standards their students should be graded? Employers will often attempt to defer 
to their employees’ suggestions, particularly where—as here—those recommendations relate to matters within the unique 
competence of the employees. 
Moreover, insofar as faculty members are given some say in more traditional managerial decisions such as the hiring and 
promotion of other personnel, such discretion does not constitute an adequate basis for the conferral of managerial or 
supervisory status. Indeed, in the typical industrial context, it is not uncommon for the employees’ union to be given the 
exclusive right to recommend personnel to the employer, and these hiring-hall agreements have been upheld even where the 
union requires a worker to pass a union-administered skills test as a condition of referral. See, e. g., Local 42 (Catalytic Constr. 
Co.), 164 N.L.R.B. 916 (1967); see generally Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11 (1961). 
 
9 The Board has also explained that the ability of the typical professional employee to influence company policy does not bestow 
managerial authority: 
“Work which is based on professional competence necessarily involves a consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, else 
professionalism would not be involved. Nevertheless, professional employees plainly are not the same as management 
employees either by definition or in authority, and managerial authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue 
of their professional status, or because work performed in that status may have a bearing on company direction.” General 
Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B., at 857–858. 
 
10 Where faculty members actually do serve as management’s representatives, the Board has not hesitated to exclude them from the 
Act’s coverage as managerial or supervisory personnel. Compare University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976) (excluding 
department chairmen as supervisors), and University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974) (excluding deans as supervisors), with 
Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975) (department chairmen included within bargaining unit because they act 
primarily as instruments of the faculty), and Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971) (including department chairmen 
because they are considered to be representatives of the faculty rather than of the administration). In fact, the bargaining unit 
approved by the Board in the present case excluded deans, acting deans, directors, and principal investigators of research and 
training grants, all of whom were deemed to exercise supervisory or managerial authority. See ante, at 870, n. 7. 
 
11 Nor does the frequency with which an employer acquiesces in the recommendations of its employees convert them into managers 
or supervisors. See Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19 (CA1 1977). Rather, the pertinent inquiries are who retains 
the ultimate decisionmaking authority and in whose interest the suggestions are offered. A different test could permit an employer 
to deny its employees the benefits of collective bargaining on important issues of wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment merely by consulting with them on a host of less significant matters and accepting their advice when it is consistent 
with management’s own objectives. 
 
12 See, e. g., App. 740–742 (faculty hiring); id., at 232–233, 632, 667 (tenure); id., at 194, 620, 742–743 (promotion); id., at 713, 
1463–1464 (retirement); id., at 241 (dismissal); id., at 362 (academic credits); id., at 723–724, 1469–1470 (cutback in departmental 
budget leading to loss of accreditation); id., at 410, 726–727 (election of department chairman and representative). 
 
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 
14 See generally J. Brubacher & W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 
1636–1976 (3d ed. 1976). In one of its earliest decisions in this area, the Board recognized that the governance structure of the 
typical modern university does not fit the mold of true collegiality in which authority rests with a peer group of scholars. Adelphi 
University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). Accord, New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 5 (1973). Even the concept of “shared 
authority,” in which university decisionmaking is seen as the joint responsibility of both faculty and administration, with each 
exerting a dominant influence in its respective sphere of expertise, has been found to be “an ideal rather than a widely adopted 
practice.” K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 4 (1978). The authors conclude: 
“Higher education is in the throes of a shift from informal and consensual judgments to authority based on formal criteria. . . . 
There have been changes in societal and legislative expectations about higher education, an increase in external regulation of 
colleges and universities, an increase in emphasis on managerial skills and the technocratic features of modern management, and 
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a greater codification of internal decisionmaking procedures. These changes raise the question whether existing statements of 
shared authority provide adequate guidelines for internal governance.” Id., at 269. 
 
15 In 1976–1977, the total expenditures of institutions of higher education in the United States exceeded $42 billion. National Center 
for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 137 (Table 133) (1979). In the same year, Yeshiva University, a private 
institution, received over $34 million in revenues from the Federal Government. Id., at 132 (Table 127). 
 
16 University faculty members have been particularly hard hit by the current financial squeeze. Because of inflation, the purchasing 
power of the faculty’s salary has declined an average of 2.9% every year since 1972. Real salaries are thus 13.6% below the 1972 
levels. Hansen, An Era of Continuing Decline: Annual Report on the Economic Status of the Profession, 1978–1979, 65 Academe: 
Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 319, 323–324 (1979). Moreover, the faculty at Yeshiva has fared 
even worse than most. Whereas the average salary of a full professor at a comparable institution is $31,100, a full professor at 
Yeshiva averages only $27,100. Id., at 334, 348. In fact, a severe financial crisis at the University in 1971–1972 forced the 
president to order a freeze on all faculty promotions and pay increases. App. 1459. 
 
17 As of January 1979, 80 private and 302 public institutions of higher education had engaged in collective bargaining with their 
faculties, and over 130,000 academic personnel had been unionized. National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in 
Higher Education, Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education i–ii (1979). Although 
the NLRA is not applicable to any public employer, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), as of 1976, 22 States had enacted legislation granting 
faculties at public institutions the right to unionize and requiring public employers to bargain with duly constituted bargaining 
agents. Mortimer & McConnell, supra, n. 14, at 53. See also Livingston & Christensen, State and Federal Regulation of Collective 
Negotiations in Higher Education, 1971 Wis.L.Rev. 91, 102. 
The upsurge in the incidence of collective bargaining has generally been attributed to the faculty’s desire to use the process as a 
countervailing force against increased administrative power and to ensure that the ideals of the academic community are actually 
practiced. As the Carnegie Commission found, “[u]nionization for [faculty] is more a protective than an aggressive act, more an 
effort to preserve the status quo than to achieve a new position of influence and affluence. . . .” Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education, Governance of Higher Education 40 (1973). See also Mortimer & McConnell, supra, n. 14, at 56; Lindeman, The 
Five Most Cited Reasons for Faculty Unionization, 102 Intellect 85 (1973); Nielsen & Polishook, Collective Bargaining and 
Beyond, The Chronicle of Higher Education 7 (May 21, 1979). 
 
18 The Carnegie Commission, in concluding that “faculty members should have the right to organize and to bargain collectively, if 
they so desire,” Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, supra, at 43, observed: “We may be involved in a long-term period of 
greater social conflict in society and greater tension on campus. If so, it may be better to institutionalize this conflict through 
collective bargaining than to have it manifest itself with less restraint. Collective bargaining does provide agreed-upon rules of 
behavior, contractual understandings, and mechanisms for dispute settlement and grievance handling that help to manage conflict.” 
Id., at 51. 
 
19 Contrary to the Court’s assertion, see ante, at 863, the Board has not abandoned the “collective authority” and “ultimate authority” 
branches of its analysis. See Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78–857, pp. 11–12, n. 8. Although the “interest/alignment analysis” 
rationale goes to the heart of the basis for the managerial and supervisory exclusions and therefore provides the strongest support 
for the Board’s determination, the other two rationales are significant because they highlight two aspects of the university 
decisionmaking process relevant to the Board’s decision: That the faculty’s influence is exercised collectively—and only 
collectively—indicates that the faculty’s recommendations embody the views of the rank and file rather than those of a select 
group of persons charged with formulating and implementing management policies. Similarly, that the administration retains 
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